The Code of Conduct Tribunal is not a “Court of Law” – Nwabueze"

Prof. Nwabueze

Professor of law and foremost constitutional lawyer, Ben

Nwabueze SAN is of the view that a tribunal is not a “court of

law” even though it may be described as a court in the general

sense of the word.

The senior advocate stated this position in a paper he presented

at the Inaugural Law Conference of the Ben Nwabueze Centre for

Studies in Constitutional Law & Related Subjects, held at the

Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Victoria Island Lagos

In the paper titled “The Code of Conduct Enshrined in the

Constitution Of Nigeria And Its Crucial Importance in the Fight

Against Corruption “, Nwabueze stated that a court composed of

members required by law to be legal practitioners or lawyers

learned and experienced in the law, who are versed in the difficult

art of sifting evidence and judging the demeanour of witnesses,

who are reared in the tradition of individual liberty inculcated in

lawyers, which insists, rightly, that it is better for nine guilty

persons to go free than for one innocent man to be punished,

and who, finally, are obligated to adjudicate disputes according to

law, or what is called justice according to law. This constitutes

one of the essential marks of a court of law.

According to him, The Code of Conduct Tribunal (CCT), which

consists of a Chairman and two other persons does not qualify to

be a “Court of Law’ because whilst the Chairman must be “a

person who has held or is qualified to hold office as a Judge of a

superior court of record in Nigeria”, the other two members are

not required to be legal practitioners or lawyers.

“It should be stated right-away that the term “court of law” is in

quote to emphasise the special significance which it carries. A

tribunal may well be described as a court in the general sense of

the word, but that does not make it a court of law, meaning a

court composed of members required by law to be legal

practitioners or lawyers learned and experienced in the law, who

are versed in the difficult art of sifting evidence and judging the

demeanour of witnesses, who are reared in the tradition of

individual liberty inculcated in lawyers, which insists, rightly, that it

is better for nine guilty persons to go free than for one innocent

man to be punished, and who, finally, are obligated to adjudicate

disputes according to law, or what is called justice according to

law. This constitutes one of the essential marks of a court of

law.

“By paragraph 15(1) of the Fifth Schedule to the Constitution, the

CCT consists of a Chairman and two other persons. But whilst

the Chairman must be “a person who has held or is qualified to

hold office as a Judge of a superior court of record in Nigeria”,

the other two members are not required to be legal practitioners

or lawyers; whether they are in fact lawyers or not (about which I

have no information) does not really matter; what matters is that

they are not required by the law of the Constitution to be legal

practitioners or lawyers.

“The CCT is required to (or may) sit in a case with all its three

members, including the two who are not required by law to be

lawyers; all three have equal power in forming the decision of the

Tribunal. It is a contradiction in terms to call by the name “court

of law”, a tribunal consisting of three members, two of whom are

not required by law to be legal practitioners or lawyers.

Accordingly, the CCT, whether or not it can truly be regarded as a

court in the general sense, does not qualify as a court of law by

the definition above. As all the courts listed in section 6(5) of the

Constitution consist of qualified lawyers with a prescribed

minimum post-qualification experience, they qualify as court of

law”, Professor Nwabueze stated.

The professor of law further stated that the Constitution

prescribes a qualification as a legal practitioner and a minimum

post-qualification experience as a legal practitioner for the

members of the courts which it establishes and invests with

criminal jurisdiction.

“If the CCT is established by the Constitution as a court of law

invested with criminal jurisdiction, the Constitution cannot,

consistently with the qualification it prescribes for the other courts

it establishes and invests with criminal jurisdiction, require only

one, the chairman, of the three members of the CCT to be a

qualified legal practitioner. This compels the conclusion that the

CCT is not conceived and established by the Constitution as a

court of law, and is not invested with criminal jurisdiction, even if

only limited criminal jurisdiction”, he added.

Also, speaking on the same topic at the event, Carol Ajie, another

Constitutional and human rights lawyer formulated two issues as

to Whether a criminal prosecution before the CCT is competently

initiated by a Director in the Federal Ministry of Justice in the

absence of an incumbent Attorney General of the Federation; and

whether the Tribunal is properly constituted to try the case sitting

with its Chairman and one other member.

Ajie, in her paper presentation noted that based on the duties

assigned to the Attorney General of the Federation in section 174

(1) of the Constitution, it would be wrong for a Director or other

officers in the Federal Ministry of Justice to exercise the AGF’s

power to initiate criminal proceedings against anyone in exercise

of the powers conferred on the Attorney General of the Federation

by Section 174(1) & (2) Of the Constitution.

She cited the Supreme Court decisions in SARAKI v F.R.N (2016)

3 NWLR (Part 1500) page 531 at 582 para D-G where the apex

court held that the Attorney-General’s power of public prosecution

is not exclusive to him as any other authority or person can

institute and undertake criminal prosecution without his authority.

According to Ajie, the Supreme Court relied on F.R.N v.

ADEWUNMI (2007) 10 NWLR (Part 1042) 399, adding that the

case was however different from the ongoing trial of Bukola

Saraki because there was no Attorney General in place who gave

the director or any officer of the Ministry the power to prosecute

Saraki.

“Therefore where the Attorney General of the Federation has not

been appointed to occupy the office of AGF, one cannot seriously

argue that a Director or other officers in the Federal Ministry of

Justice would exercise the AGF’s power to initiate criminal

proceedings against anyone in exercise of the powers conferred

on the Attorney General of the Federation by Section 174(1) & (2)

Of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999.

Regardless of the Law Officers Act, a subordinate and scanty

piece of legislation cannot override the rich text of our

constitutional provision.

“However, we must pause to ponder whether powers exercised or

donated by the incumbent AG are asphyxiated when AG leaves

office.

“To take care of the concerns that the administration of criminal

justice would come to a complete halt as pending criminal

matters would stop whenever Attorneys General exit and resume

when they assume office. For the avoidance of doubt, criminal

proceedings would not come to an abrupt end as pending

matters authorised by the AG or AGF remain pending despite a

natural person not being appointed to the office of the Attorney

General”, Ajie Stated.

On the issue of whether the Tribunal is properly constituted to try

the case sitting with its Chairman and one other member, Ajie

stated “the ordinary dictionary defines “consist” to mean “form”

“compose” “comprise”. Three is the required number to achieve

harmony e.g . in the event of a tie, the third member would break

the tie. Won’t he or she? Therefore the draftspersons are right in

making “3” mandatory for the Tribunal to be able to sit in

judgment where three (3)“consist” or “form” a Tribunal session. It

is my respectful view that words should be given their ordinary

meaning.

“The provisions of the Constitution being sacrosanct cannot be

amended, altered or removed except by a subsequent

constitutional amendment. Therefore importing the words ‘two is

a quorum’ under the guise of applying the Interpretation Act

where an ambiguity does not arise defeats its ordinary, natural

and plain grammatical construction”, she added